I enjoyed this post, Roxanne, and basically agree with your conclusions. But allow me to probe your analysis a little some, please, and make sure I understand the potential implications.
For the distinction you make between mimetic behavior and emotivism - is the worry there that, well, potentially anyone could be charged with a 'hate crime' under this law, and based on their reflexive (even subconscious?) imitation of an associated affinity group's beliefs and convictions? And when real and actual hate - so much as it can theoretically be prosecuted - is probably more emotive and ambiguous in character?
I get the sense that the incoherence here may lie in the final indeterminacy (or unknowability) of expressive motive and intention, perhaps. Would you agree with such an assertion? And, if that seems about right - i.e., that the law is therefore and finally misguided - what are the potential tradeoffs for striking it on grounds of the same incoherence?
That is to say, do we possibly see more public violence and bigotry as an outcome-based account of such a move? And, if so, is this possibly just the (regrettable) price to be paid for us living in free and pluralistic societies?
I'm sitting here in the U.S., obviously, looking in from the outside to Canada. But, of course, we have this same type of public policy debate all the time here, too. It's hyper-relevant in both our national contexts.
Your assessment is an accurate one. In Canada we have a progressive hysteria about the high level of hatred, a self declared expert on hate claimed there are 300 far right hate groups a few years ago and she’s refused to name them.
At this point a women’s organisation that states men aren’t women is considered hateful to such “anti hate” activists. Because hate is now considered an offense against an identity and not a human being.
Actual hatred is emotive and ambiguous and it’s rare, despite what progressives would have us think. Disagreement and rejection of identity isn’t hate. It’s reasonable comment on important issues. We have a cohort of progressives pushing for censorship laws and stating intention doesn’t matter etc. That’s a dangerous path.
I think living in a free society means we will see bigotry. We have laws to address violence against humans and property and we have defamation laws. We can’t start passing legislation that says opposing an idea or an identity-based belief system is hateful. That’s simply an anathema to freedom.
Hi again, Roxanne. I'm thinking more now about your claim that actual hate is rare. I'd like to test the proposition some more, if possible. First then, why do you think actual hate is so rare? Does it return to this same distinction you make, between mimetic behavior and emotivism? Or for other and/or complementary reasons?
I want to test also whether the discipline of Semiotics might give us some useful insights into the matter. Are you familiar with semiotic analysis and, if so, what are your initial intuitions regarding how it might tease apart mimesis from emotivism?
When I say it’s rare I mean by the confines of the law, section 319. Case law research shows that it’s rare, because of the narrow application of section 319 to extreme cases. Not that familiar with semiotics and I’d be interested to see that analysis playing out.
So, on the semiotics front then - I don't claim to be any authority here - but I maybe have enough passable knowledge, on the subject matter, to do it layman's justice here.
Short version is that most of the contemporary analysis seems to be inspired originally from the 19th century philosopher Charles Sanders Pierce, who invented the idea of the triadic sign relationship, and where - for any particular object or idea we want to think or talk about - there's going to be some sort of sign (or signs) that represents it, a thought (or concept, or understanding) that is evoked from an object or idea's sign, and then the object or ideation itself.
And the goal of semiotic analysis, then, is to map out and explain how the sign representation, the 'interpretant,' and the thing-in-question itself (1) interact with one another, and (2) how that triadic relationship can change and shift over time and place and culture.
//break//
In this context then, if Semiotics shares a sort of analytic sympathy with mimetic theory, one could imagine targets of plausible hate to actually - and in some, or a lot?, of cases - merely be symbols or indices (two more technical semiotic terms we can unwrap, if desirable) of a crime perpetrator's extremely negative affect and disposition.
Or which is to say, there is no genuine hate existing there - as you've plausibly asserted in your post - but rather it's something like an ersatz hate almost. And where, say, a target of opportunity just happens to be the convenient and timely victim of someone exercising their regrettable manifestation of stereotyping and caricature of an Out Group member.
The sort of thematic subtext would be: "Civilization needs its enemies."
And if you should be so unlucky, as to fulfill a good cast-type for one of this person's/civilization's enemies?
Well, again, it's a no-kidding shame and highly unfortunate. But perhaps the actor exacting the violence, or ersatz hate. is just interpreting your being - in the Piercean semiotic sense - as a really good register of something that inspires reflexive disgust in them and mimetic trigger.
//break//
That's the theory of the case, anyway, and if I understand it decently at all.
I am not yet super-deep into the academic literature there, either, so I reserve the right to take back later what I am going to say next:
A decent amount of semiotic analysis, or at least what I've observed so far, looks to be slightly unfalsifiable in character. It appears to me to be a little bit 'expressionist' in character, that is, and so open to a lot of different and wide-ranging interpretation.
I still find it interesting all the same, and a worthwhile intellectual puzzle for now. But I am not at all convinced it is any type of Holy Grail for psychological analysis, which I gather some semioticians desire it to be.
Anyway, there is now the long and longer version of my story. : ) Thanks for humoring it.
Thank you for that, Luke. That seems reasonable. It lines up with Girard’s Mimetic Theory. I’ll post a longer response or maybe write an essay about your theory soon, I’m off to a Christmas banquet.
Ah, okay! That makes a little bit more sense; sure. I take Section 319 to be something sort of like the "time, place, and manner" restrictions that we have on free speech here in the U.S.
(And I was not aware until now, incidentally, that Canadian law explicitly outlaws the promotion of anti-Semitism. Quite interesting by itself.)
I'll come back in a minute, and in a different reply, to offer up how Semiotics might/might not speak well to these distinctions you make in your post.
That seems right to me too, Roxanne, and consistent with my core beliefs and socialization/upbringing. But just to say the matter deserves to have a foot-stomp and redoubled shout-out to principles of individual liberty and freedom, which some will just not agree with - or have the intuition to - at the end of the day.
I gather the most charitable argument, for the opposing side here, is some sort of probabilities-based Consequentialism. But which also, arguably - if the law in question were enforced too ambitiously or aggressively, over time - could potentially have the opposite and countervailing effect (i.e., increasing genuine hatred and resentment amongst people, and increasing the likelihood of violent public outbursts).
Agree. And actually the culture of forced identity idolatry has created a backlash. The obvious inequality of identity based policies (DEI-esque, if you will) have resulted in resentment, hostility, despair, cynicism, etc. The stuff about land claims and the whole discourse on land acknowledgements is an example of such a scenario.
This normal human response is likely what the progressives identity cult sees as hate, in their misguided view of human society and the human condition.
Possibly also, we just often don't have a very good appreciation for the ironies and paradoxes that will inevitably pop up, and in the course of a particular line of action or thought regime. No matter, moreover, what our particular ideology, dogma, or reflexive belief-set is.
And at least not until those paradoxical cases confront us head on, let's imagine.
Like here, for example, and to consider one potential counter-DEI boomerang effect going on right now in the U.S.:
I'll bet you anything this was not the outcomes-based intent of the current American executive. But perhaps that's still okay, finally, and because this is just what commutative justice means... not what its rival, distributive justice model (i.e., of DEI-dom) would/previously did prohibit from taking place.
I enjoyed this post, Roxanne, and basically agree with your conclusions. But allow me to probe your analysis a little some, please, and make sure I understand the potential implications.
For the distinction you make between mimetic behavior and emotivism - is the worry there that, well, potentially anyone could be charged with a 'hate crime' under this law, and based on their reflexive (even subconscious?) imitation of an associated affinity group's beliefs and convictions? And when real and actual hate - so much as it can theoretically be prosecuted - is probably more emotive and ambiguous in character?
I get the sense that the incoherence here may lie in the final indeterminacy (or unknowability) of expressive motive and intention, perhaps. Would you agree with such an assertion? And, if that seems about right - i.e., that the law is therefore and finally misguided - what are the potential tradeoffs for striking it on grounds of the same incoherence?
That is to say, do we possibly see more public violence and bigotry as an outcome-based account of such a move? And, if so, is this possibly just the (regrettable) price to be paid for us living in free and pluralistic societies?
I'm sitting here in the U.S., obviously, looking in from the outside to Canada. But, of course, we have this same type of public policy debate all the time here, too. It's hyper-relevant in both our national contexts.
I'm grateful in advance for your time.
cheers,
Luke
Your assessment is an accurate one. In Canada we have a progressive hysteria about the high level of hatred, a self declared expert on hate claimed there are 300 far right hate groups a few years ago and she’s refused to name them.
At this point a women’s organisation that states men aren’t women is considered hateful to such “anti hate” activists. Because hate is now considered an offense against an identity and not a human being.
Actual hatred is emotive and ambiguous and it’s rare, despite what progressives would have us think. Disagreement and rejection of identity isn’t hate. It’s reasonable comment on important issues. We have a cohort of progressives pushing for censorship laws and stating intention doesn’t matter etc. That’s a dangerous path.
I think living in a free society means we will see bigotry. We have laws to address violence against humans and property and we have defamation laws. We can’t start passing legislation that says opposing an idea or an identity-based belief system is hateful. That’s simply an anathema to freedom.
Hi again, Roxanne. I'm thinking more now about your claim that actual hate is rare. I'd like to test the proposition some more, if possible. First then, why do you think actual hate is so rare? Does it return to this same distinction you make, between mimetic behavior and emotivism? Or for other and/or complementary reasons?
I want to test also whether the discipline of Semiotics might give us some useful insights into the matter. Are you familiar with semiotic analysis and, if so, what are your initial intuitions regarding how it might tease apart mimesis from emotivism?
When I say it’s rare I mean by the confines of the law, section 319. Case law research shows that it’s rare, because of the narrow application of section 319 to extreme cases. Not that familiar with semiotics and I’d be interested to see that analysis playing out.
So, on the semiotics front then - I don't claim to be any authority here - but I maybe have enough passable knowledge, on the subject matter, to do it layman's justice here.
Short version is that most of the contemporary analysis seems to be inspired originally from the 19th century philosopher Charles Sanders Pierce, who invented the idea of the triadic sign relationship, and where - for any particular object or idea we want to think or talk about - there's going to be some sort of sign (or signs) that represents it, a thought (or concept, or understanding) that is evoked from an object or idea's sign, and then the object or ideation itself.
And the goal of semiotic analysis, then, is to map out and explain how the sign representation, the 'interpretant,' and the thing-in-question itself (1) interact with one another, and (2) how that triadic relationship can change and shift over time and place and culture.
//break//
In this context then, if Semiotics shares a sort of analytic sympathy with mimetic theory, one could imagine targets of plausible hate to actually - and in some, or a lot?, of cases - merely be symbols or indices (two more technical semiotic terms we can unwrap, if desirable) of a crime perpetrator's extremely negative affect and disposition.
Or which is to say, there is no genuine hate existing there - as you've plausibly asserted in your post - but rather it's something like an ersatz hate almost. And where, say, a target of opportunity just happens to be the convenient and timely victim of someone exercising their regrettable manifestation of stereotyping and caricature of an Out Group member.
The sort of thematic subtext would be: "Civilization needs its enemies."
And if you should be so unlucky, as to fulfill a good cast-type for one of this person's/civilization's enemies?
Well, again, it's a no-kidding shame and highly unfortunate. But perhaps the actor exacting the violence, or ersatz hate. is just interpreting your being - in the Piercean semiotic sense - as a really good register of something that inspires reflexive disgust in them and mimetic trigger.
//break//
That's the theory of the case, anyway, and if I understand it decently at all.
I am not yet super-deep into the academic literature there, either, so I reserve the right to take back later what I am going to say next:
A decent amount of semiotic analysis, or at least what I've observed so far, looks to be slightly unfalsifiable in character. It appears to me to be a little bit 'expressionist' in character, that is, and so open to a lot of different and wide-ranging interpretation.
I still find it interesting all the same, and a worthwhile intellectual puzzle for now. But I am not at all convinced it is any type of Holy Grail for psychological analysis, which I gather some semioticians desire it to be.
Anyway, there is now the long and longer version of my story. : ) Thanks for humoring it.
Thank you for that, Luke. That seems reasonable. It lines up with Girard’s Mimetic Theory. I’ll post a longer response or maybe write an essay about your theory soon, I’m off to a Christmas banquet.
Ah, okay! That makes a little bit more sense; sure. I take Section 319 to be something sort of like the "time, place, and manner" restrictions that we have on free speech here in the U.S.
(And I was not aware until now, incidentally, that Canadian law explicitly outlaws the promotion of anti-Semitism. Quite interesting by itself.)
I'll come back in a minute, and in a different reply, to offer up how Semiotics might/might not speak well to these distinctions you make in your post.
That seems right to me too, Roxanne, and consistent with my core beliefs and socialization/upbringing. But just to say the matter deserves to have a foot-stomp and redoubled shout-out to principles of individual liberty and freedom, which some will just not agree with - or have the intuition to - at the end of the day.
I gather the most charitable argument, for the opposing side here, is some sort of probabilities-based Consequentialism. But which also, arguably - if the law in question were enforced too ambitiously or aggressively, over time - could potentially have the opposite and countervailing effect (i.e., increasing genuine hatred and resentment amongst people, and increasing the likelihood of violent public outbursts).
Agree. And actually the culture of forced identity idolatry has created a backlash. The obvious inequality of identity based policies (DEI-esque, if you will) have resulted in resentment, hostility, despair, cynicism, etc. The stuff about land claims and the whole discourse on land acknowledgements is an example of such a scenario.
This normal human response is likely what the progressives identity cult sees as hate, in their misguided view of human society and the human condition.
That’s interesting; thanks, Roxanne.
Possibly also, we just often don't have a very good appreciation for the ironies and paradoxes that will inevitably pop up, and in the course of a particular line of action or thought regime. No matter, moreover, what our particular ideology, dogma, or reflexive belief-set is.
And at least not until those paradoxical cases confront us head on, let's imagine.
Like here, for example, and to consider one potential counter-DEI boomerang effect going on right now in the U.S.:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2025/12/04/trump-dei-ban-college-men/#:~:text=Trump's%20attack%20on%20DEI%20may,that%20often%20benefit%20college%20men
The 'so what'
I'll bet you anything this was not the outcomes-based intent of the current American executive. But perhaps that's still okay, finally, and because this is just what commutative justice means... not what its rival, distributive justice model (i.e., of DEI-dom) would/previously did prohibit from taking place.